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A RULE IS A RULE BECAUSE IT IS THE RULE:
INTELLECTUAL CRISIS IN CONFLICT OF LAWS
E. F.

ROBERTS-

I.
MECHANICAL

JURISPRUDENCE

G RANTED

THAT PLAINTIFF sues defendant in "the forum"
claiming the right to compensation for damages, say for negligent

misstatement; recovery hinges in the first instance on the question
whether negligent misstatement is actionable as a wrong within the
forum. The answer to this question, of course, depends upon the
substantive tort law of the forum, more likely than not case holdings
in this particular instance. This answer in turn itself depends upon
the calculations of the judiciary as to the wisdom of allowing recovery
for negligent misstatement, calculations which involve not merely the
facts of the cases actually decided, but which include, albeit perhaps
only implicitly, an evaluation of the social and economic consequences
of creating such a right.' In short, considerations of the policy best
suited to the forum have entered the equation and, in theory, if the
action exists recovery is allowed because it is in the best interest of
the society in the forum.
Suppose, however, that the forum has not allowed negligent
misstatement as the basis of a claim sounding in tort, having concluded that recovery would wreak havoc with commercial transactions.
Suppose, further, that another plaintiff sues another defendant in the
forum, likewise claiming the right to compensation for damages, again
because of negligent misstatement, but in this instance, suppose still
further that the incident, including both the statement and the resultant
harm, occurred in some other single forum.2 One reaction might be to
t B.A., 1952, Northeastern University; LL.B., 1954, Boston College; Professor
of Law, Villanova University.
1. E.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) ; Glanzer
v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). See also Candler v. Crane, Christmas
& Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164 (C.A.), overruled, Hedley Bryne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller
& Partners, Ltd., [1963] 3 Weekly L.R. 101 (H.L.).
2. This supposition avoids the necessity of getting involved in those cases where the
act is done in state A, but the harm ensues in state B. Given the lex loci delicti rule,
of course, one must have a precise "either/or" answer to this problem, such as the last
event doctrine of the Restatement. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT ov LAWS § 377 (1934) :
the place of the wrong is "where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for
an alleged tort takes place." Negligence not being actionable without harm resulting
to plaintiff, it appears that the place where the harm occurs is the key to the choice
of law problem. Yet, is harm actionable without negligence? Cf. GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAws 263 (3d Ed. 1949) ; Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1964

1

WINTER

1964]

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1964], Art. 2
CONFLICT IN

CONFLICTS

dismiss the case because such wrongs are not actionable in the forum.
But in this instance the case is not a simple tort case necessitating such
a reaction, but, since the event transpired elsewhere, it is a conflict of
laws case. This being so, the reaction in the forum will involve the
application of another body of rules, namely conflict of laws, and, more
particularly, the choice of law rules of that discipline. It is a kindergarten fact that the lex loci delicti governs the tort, so that now the
question whether negligent misstatement is actionable in this instance
turns upon the case law of the place where the incident occurred.
Since the event transpired in another place, recovery in the forum
turns in part on the policy judgment by the courts of that other place
whether to make negligent misstatement actionable. But, and this is
crucial, recovery also hinges on the fact that the judges in the forum
choose to apply the lex loci delicti to the question rather than to decide
the case pursuant to the lex fori. In deciding this the forum has, at
least in theory, decided that this way of handling conflict of laws
situations is in the best interest of the forum. It follows, therefore,
that in the ultimate analysis, recovery in the forum still depends upon
the policy of the forum as well as the policy of the other place where
the tort happened.3
Why should it be thought that it is in the best interest of the
forum to apply the lex loci delicti to govern the tort which occurred
in the other place? Is it policy, expediency, or what, which prompted
the forum to develop this particular choice of law rule? One cannot
answer this question in today's terms and arrive at the correct answer.
To understand the "why" it is necessary to pose the question in the
context where and when it arose, and evaluate the response in the
light of the thinking of the times.' Once this is done it will be seen
Rrv. 881, 887-88 (1951). But if one perforce must have a subsidiary rule in order
for the primary rule of lex loci delicti to function, and if the primary rule is beyond
the pale of immediate policy considerations, either event is an equally rational trigger
mechanism to cut off debate.
3. It is true, of course, that notwithstanding, the actionability of the event according to the lex loci delicti, the forum might refuse to enforce the right if to do so
would violate its "public policy." Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111,
120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918) ; RES'rAEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934). Be that
as it may, the forum does not purport to apply its own law to the situation, but simply
refuses to enforce the right created elsewhere. The policy here may be nothing more
than the effort to avoid "scandal": that is, certain claims, valid where they arise,
would oppugn the folkways of the forum; that allowing the presentation of the claim
in detail and then awarding compensation would outrage the public, bringing the
court into public disrespect. The same considerations do not apply when the claim
has already been reduced elsewhere to a judgment since the gory details of the underlying claim are then not relevant to the proceedings in the forum. Hence, perhaps,
the different result. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 28 S.Ct. 641 (1908).
4. Hence Kluckhohn encountered difficulty making any sense whatever out of
certain Navaho activities. Then he realized that while such conduct made no sense to
the alien, an observer willing to adapt himself to the mental outlook of the participants
themselves could see a great deal of sense in the affair. Kluckhohn, The Philosophy
of the Navaho Indians, in IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER (Northrop
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that this approach was so self-evident that any other approach would
have been unthinkable.
In the nineteenth century, after all, it was not at all clear that
"civil procedure" and "torts" were distinct disciplines. Indeed,
lawyers did not think in terms of "one civil action" and "negligence,"
but rather they talked about "trespass" and "case," commingling writ
and right. Events gave rise to causes of actions: a belt with a bat
was matched by its coefficient, trespass. But if the act and the wrong,
if any, were all part of the whole complex, recourse had to be had to a
law, a set of norms, with which to evaluate the event. Event and
wrong being one and the same, it was obvious that only the law
of the place where the event occurred applied to the question whether
or not the act was a wrong. This had to be so since only the polity
where the event transpired had authority to regulate the event and
hence to categorize it as wrong or no. Little wonder is it then that
Mr. Justice Holmes, in speaking of such a case, should say that "the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly
by the law of the country where the act is done. .

.

. For another

jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him
according to its own notions rather than those of the place where
he did the acts ... would be unjust . . . '
While the rule may have appeared obvious to the judges of the
nineteenth century, the problem now becomes one of determining why,
granted the rule was rooted in a particular conceptual framework, it
should have survived with such astounding vigor long after the cultural
milieu which saw its birth had itself dissolved. It should be observed
that "tort" itself has undergone a tremendous revolution since the
mid-nineteenth century; debates about direct versus consequential harm
giving way to negligence concepts premised on the risk principle,
followed now by an apparently inevitable trend toward absolute
liability.' But whereas tort law, as a device used to allocate loss
attributable to accidents, was situated in the very vortex of a changing
society, conflict of laws was a backwater, relatively divorced from the
ed. 1949); NORTHROP, THt COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE 59
(1959). On the application of this to conflict of laws, see, e.g., EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 344 (1962)
"One of the 'exceptions,' which permitted the foreign statute
to be enforced only if it was substantially similar to that of the forum, promised
restoration of the lex fori as the basic law. But this principle was not acceptable to
Holmes and Cardozo, judges steeped in the universalist illusion of their time, who
were about to lay the groundwork for the grand scheme adopted in the Restatement,
according to which rights lawfully vested shall be everywhere maintained."'
5. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356, 29 S.Ct. 511,
512 (1909).
6. E.g., in order, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916) ; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (concurring opinion) ; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d
81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). See note 37 infra.
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mainstream of economic and social evolution. Choice of law being
relatively a technician's private world insulated from the direct pressure
of changes in the structure of society, the lex loci delicti rule simply
lived on unnoticed. Living on, the rule gained authority by constant
repetition, and, as any anthropologist would know, this repetitive
phenomenon, at first merely normative, took on the quality of the
norm.' Even without the nineteenth century conceptual framework
out of which the rule evolved, the rule had become so sacrosanct in its
own right that it needed no justification: it was self-evidently correct.
Lawyers tended, therefore, to react to the stimulus of a conflict
situation in torts along the same intellectual circuit, lex loci delicti
having become programmed into the intellectual apparatus of conflict
of laws. Even when courts sometimes avoided the full implications
of the rule by deciding a case by extracting from it an issue other
than the tort one, as for example, capacity of *the parties to sue each
other, this served only to reinforce adherence to the rule, highlighting
the fact that lex loci delicti qua ptinciple itself was unquestionable."
But given the programme built into the legal system, that is, granted
judges and lawyers all reacted to the stimulus of tort with the invocation of the lex loci delicti rule, this built-in behavior pattern did have
practical merit: given a situation involving such a case, prediction
as to how the law machine would function was relatively easy. And,
it should be noted, the value of the rule as a predictive device served
only to increase still further the emotional attachment to the rule by
all concerned, since for most people belief in any rule, regardless of
its merit, is preferable to a world sans rules.
II.
THE Ni~w LOOK

In Babcock v. Jackson' the New York courts were presented with
a situation where a New York car owner invited a fellow New Yorker
to be a guest on a weekend drive into Ontario and back. Once in
Ontario the host lost control of his vehicle and it went into a stone wall
7. "In society what is takes on the compulsive quality of ought....

most do, others should do." HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A

What the
STUDY IN

COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS 15 (1954).
8. There are, of course, a number of instances when the forum avoided the lcx
loci delicti by extracting a different issue from the case: this, after all, merely illustrates the importance of characterization. Thompson v. Thompson, 193 A.2d 439
(N.H. 1963); Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936). Yet, isn't how
the question is framed the key to any case? How did Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938), come to turn on the "unconstitutionality" of the
course of conduct taken since Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) ? How did
the issue change from a relative quibble to an all important seminal question on
appeal in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)?
9. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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and the guest was injured. The guest brought suit in New York,
alleging negligence on the part of her host. Inexorably the lower courts
dismissed the action, this because the automatic invocation of the
"conflict of laws, choice of law, torts, lex loci delicti, ergo Ontario
law governs the tort" equation pointed to the fact that in that Province
no cause of action for negligence existed on such facts." The Court
of Appeals treatment of the problem, however, was direct and to the
point. As seen by that court the issue raised on appeal was whether
"the law of the place of the tort [shall] invariably govern the availability of relief for the tort. .

.

.

",.

Thus, avoiding devices such as

characterization, or renvoi, the court deliberately attacked the sacrosanct lex loci delicti axiom head on. While not once using the precise
phrase, the court adopted in lieu of lex loci the "proper law" approach
reminiscent of recent contract cases, and applied it to the present
tort situation.12
The proper law approach to contract cases is, of course, an
importation from England." Interestingly enough, the Babcock opinion
calls to mind an article by J. H. C. Morris, published in the Harvard
Law Review a dozen years ago, entitled, aptly enough, The Proper
Law of a Tort.14 The whole thrust of this article was "to suggest
that there is room for a similar approach in the field of torts."' 5 Indeed,
it may be of interest to read parts of the Morris argument in conjunction with the reasoning of the New York Court.
MORRIS

FULD, J.

It may be conceded that in

Where the defendant's exercise

many, perhaps most, situations

of due care . . . is in issue, the

there would be no need to look
beyond the law of the place of the

jurisdiction in which the allegedly
wrongful conduct occurred will

wrong. . . 16

usually have a predominant,
if not
7

exclusive, concern.'

10. Babcock v. Jackson, 17 App. Div. 2d 094, 230 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1962).
11. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 477, 191 N.E.2d 279, 280, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743, 746 (1963).
12. Id. at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
13. Dic~v, CONFLICT or LAWS 717 (7th ed. 1958). Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155,
124 N.E.2d 99 (1954):
Although this "grouping of contacts" theory may, perhaps, afford less certainty
and predictability than the rigid general rules . . . , the merit of its approach is
that it gives to the place having the most interest in the problem "paramount
control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context, thus
allowing the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction" most intimately concerned with the outcome of [the] particular litigation. (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 161, 124 N.E.2d at 102. See also, RISTATE:MENT (SECONO), CONFLICT or LAWS
§ 332a (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
14. 64 HARV. L. Rtv. 881 (1951).
15. Morris, The ProperLaw of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. Rtv. 881, 883 (1951).
16. Id. at 884.
17. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 483, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743, 750 (1963).
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But we ought to have a conflict
rule broad and flexible enough to
take care of exceptional situations as well as the more normal
ones. .

.

. Otherwise the results

Be that as it may, however, reconsideration of the inflexible traditional rule persuades us that...
its application may lead to . . .
anomalous results.19

will begin to offend our common
8
sense.'
Finally, the hypothetical suggested by Morris and the fact of Babcock,
while quite different, evoke remarkably similar reactions. Thus:
An American co-educational
school establishes for its students
a summer vacation camp in . . .
Quebec. The camp is entirely selfcontained and self-supporting and
there is no other human being
within 50 miles. One of the girls
is seduced 'by one of the boys so
that she becomes pregnant; another is bitten by a dog kept in
the camp by another boy. Neither
incident would have happened but
for the negligence of the camp
organizers, who are instructors in
the school. The girls, the boys,
and the organizers are all residents
of State X, an American state,
where also the school is located. 20

The present action involves injuries sustained by a New York
guest as the result of the negligence of a New York host in
the operation of an automobile,
garaged, licensed and undoubtedly
insured in New York, in the
course of a weekend journey which
began and was to end there. In
sharp contrast, Ontario's sole relationship with the occurrence is the
purely adventitious circumstance
21
that the accident occurred there.

Does it make sense to say that
the question whether the girls or
their parents can sue the boys
or their parents or the camp or-

Per contra, Ontario has no conceivable interest in denying a
remedy to a New York guest
against his New York host for injuries suffered in Ontario by reason of conduct which
was tortious
23
under Ontario law.

ganizers . . . "must" be governed

by the law of Quebec, merely because the incidents happened there?

22
To the present writer it does not.

This is not to say that the New York court relied exclusively on

Morris: it did not.2" Rather, it ought to be observed that the approach
18. Morris, supra note 15, at 885.
19. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
743, 751 (1963).
20. Morris, supra note 15, at 885.
21. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
743, 750 (1963).
22. Morris, supra note 15, at 885.
23. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
743, 750 (1963).
24. Id. at 478, nn.3 & 4, 191 N.E.2d at
nn.3 & 4 (1963).
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and the conceptual framework espoused by Morris has become commonplace so that ideas once revolutionary are now reflected as obvious
statements in the judicial opinion.
The proper law approach in contracts has been effective because
it enables courts to select the proper law, not of the "contract," but
the proper law applicable to the precise problem of contract at hand,
be it capacity, performance, or illegality. It was Cook, after all, who
had suggested that the solution to contract cases lay in isolating the
precise problem and making the choice of law as to it. 25 Similarly,

Morris suggested that "tort" be broken down into smaller units, such
as negligence, defamation, and the like, and choice of law be tailored
to the problem involved in each kind of case. 26 The Court of Appeals,
however, goes further; it breaks "negligence" down into its constituent
parts, applying New York law to the question of liability for the harm,
but, at the same time, noting that the standard of care would be
governed by Ontario law." In short, just as a contract is a kaleidescope
of distinct issues, each of which involves a separate choice of law, so,
too, "there is no reason why all issues arising out of a tort claim
must be resolved by reference to the law of the same jurisdiction. 2-8
III.
PROPHETS OF CHANGE:

NEW

PUNCH

CARDS FOR OLD

Morris's article marked an intellectual turning-point; the mechanical application of lex loci delicti was discredited, and an alternative

device was suggested. The trouble lay now in the fact that the profferred alternative was not particularly attractive because the actual
choice-of-law process, the real dirty work, was left unprogrammed.
The lawyer was told that torts ought to be governed by their "proper
law," but he was not told how he was to ascertain what was the proper
law. "Absurd" was the reaction of an English commentator,29 questionbegging" the objection of American students,3" and, finally, "give-it-up
formula" was the charge levelled by an American authority.3 ' Granted
then that the lex loci rule did work an occasional injustice, it was still
preferable until it could be replaced by another choice of law device
25. COOK, THn LOGICAl. AND LEGAL BAS S Or THI CONFLICT or LAWS 431 (1942).
26. Morris, supra note 15, at 884.
27. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 484, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743, 752 (1963).
28. Ibid.
29. Gow, Delict and PrivateInternationalLaw, 65 L.Q. Rev. 313, 316 (1949).
30. Note, The Second Conflicts, Restatement of Torts: A Caveat, 51 CALIF. L.
REv. 762, 776 (1963).

31.

EHRENZWEIG, CONrLICT or LAWs

548 (1962).
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capable of providing working guidelines equivalent in certainty of application-in short, until another fully programmed device was invented.
Whether we like to admit it or not, each of us sees the world
through concepts common to our own time. A mind trained to think
like Ptolemy and another like Copernicus are different instruments:
they see the same things differently. We do have our a prioris--our
native twenty-questions-like animal, vegetable, or mineral categoriesaround, and in terms of which we organize the flux around us.3

2

These

categories, can't helps, postulates, call them what you will, are not
a priori in the sense that they represent any eternal truths: they simply
crystallize ways of thinking which work for us. 3 They remain self34
evidently true only so long as we have no cause to doubt them.
Further, these basic postulates are acquired by the accident that we are
born into a particular culture. 5 Thus our concepts are formulated by
32. There is a great deal of truth, therefore, in the assertion that "Man exists
in a world of his own creation." JOHNSON, A TREATISE ON LANGUAGE 29 (Paper-

bound ed. 1959). Compare LEwis,

MIND) AND THE WORLD ORDER

29-30 (Dover ed.

1956) : "The world of experience is not given in experience: it is constructed by
thought from the data of sense. This reality which everybody knows reflects the
structure of human intelligence as much as it does the nature of the independently
given sensory content."; MONTAGU, MAN IN PROCESS 83 (1961): "The law and order
that man sees in Nature he introduces there, a fact of which he seems to have groxvn
quite unconscious. Natural systems of classification work so well that, following an
unconscious pragmatic principle, they are assumed to be true. . . ." See also Keyser,
The Nature of the Doctrinal Function and Its Role in Rational Thought, 41 YALE
L.J. 713 (1932).
This particular approach finds itself reflected in the poetry of Wallace Stevens,
particularly in The Idea of Order at Key West. WHICHER & AHNEBRINK, TWELVE
AMERICAN POETS 100 (Oxford ed. 1961): "A final clue to Stevens. . . . The world
we inhabit is one we 'half create;' we make the order we perceive." For an interesting diversion read in conjunction with Stevens the following dictum from T. E.
Hulme: "Why is it that London looks pretty by night? Because for the general
cindery chaos there is substituted a simple ordered arrangement of a finite number
of lights." Consider also that the same author put forth the ideas that: "The aim of
science and of all thought is to reduce the complex and inevitable disconnected world
of grit and cinders to a few ideal counters, which we can move about and so form
an ungritlike picture of reality - one flattering to our sense of power over the
world" and, "Animals are in the same state that men were before symbolic language

was invented."

HULM9, SPECULATIONS

221, 224, 229 (Routledge ed. 1960).

33. For the plight of an individual accustomed to one culture being subjected to
the criminal law of a totally alien one, see Wurm, Aboriginal Languages and the Law,
6 U.W. AUSTL. ANN. L. Rev. 1 (1963). An interesting sidelight is set forth in
WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY

57-58 (1956).

34. The debt due to C. S. Peirce is obvious: see his "Fixation of Belief" now

available in VALUES IN A
35. JASPERS, MAN IN

UNIVERSE OF CHANGE 91-112 (Anchor ed. 1958).
THE MODERN AGE 110 (Anchor ed. 1957) : "Man

is not

what he is solely by virtue of biological inheritance, but also . . . what tradition
makes him." Compare with this Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Minerville
School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596, 60 S.Ct. 1010, 1014 (1940): "The
ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment. Such a
sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and spirit which may serve
to gather up the traditions of a people, transmit them from generation to generation,
and thereby create that continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a
civilization. 'We live by symbols'."
Thus it has been said that, "the binding force of law is a reality merely as an
idea in human minds. There is nothing in the outside world which corresponds to

this idea."

OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT

17 (1939).

QUEST OF ITSELF 134 (1940) ; NEKAM, THE
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society and, per force, are subject to modification as society changes, and
our traditional concepts cease to explain and order the flux around us. 6
From an assortment of cases premised on "fault," torts is becoming a device to allocate the immense burden of paying for the losses
attributable to accidents in our urban, industrialized society. The trend
is toward absolute liability: "compensation," "loss distribution," and
"insurance" are the concepts by which order is now imposed upon
the field of tort cases.37 Granted that the functions performed by torts
have changed and that our outlook toward torts has changed, it should
cause little wonder should someone suggest that the proper law to
govern a tort is the law that the parties and their insurers should
have forseen when they calculated the possibility of loss and created
a fund to defray it. Thus, granted "enterprise liability" affords an
explanation of what is going on in the tort area itself, isn't it only
logical to expect that this order-affording concept should be carried
over into the conflict of laws field and there be made the keystone
of a formula for ascertaining the proper law of a tort?38
At the same time it is becoming more evident that the "common
law" has atrophied in this country, if by common law one means a
system of case law keyed into a system of rigid stare decisis. Notwithstanding proclamations to the contrary, the law does partake
somewhat of a brooding omnipresence in the sky, not existing in
concrete cases of a particular jurisdiction but in the "better view."
The decision reflecting the best "policy result," attained after "balancing
the interests" involved in light of the "social needs" of the times, is
the "right result."'3' Little wonder again should be engendered should
this approach be transferred into the conflict of law area, and the
criteria for choosing proper law be oriented around the problem of
selecting the best policy in the light of the "governmental interest"
of the forum."'
ENTITY 1-10 (1938);

Shepard, Law and Obedience, 33 AM. POL.

798-99 (1939).

Sci.

Rtv. 738,

36. To see an example of the reaction when old ideas cease to explain the way
the world works, read Frank, The Principle of Disorderand Incongruity in Economic

Affairs, 47 POL. Sci. Q. 515 (1932). For the wider implications of this see KENNAN,
REALITIES oF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLIcY 34 (1954); SNOW, Timl Two CULTURES

44 (1959).
37. E.g., Friedmann, Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability, 63
HARV. L. Rsv. 241 (1949); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability,

37 VA. L. Rtv. 359 (1951).
38. EHRgNZW4IG, CONFLICT op LAWS §§ 217-226 (1962) ; Ehrenzweig, Guest
Statutes in the Conflict of Laws - Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under
"Foreseeable and Insurable Laws" (pts. 1-3), 69 YALE L.J. 595, 794, 978 (1960);
but see, Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process - The Insignificance
of Foresight,70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961).
39. Goodhart, Case Law in England and America, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 173 (1930).
40. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
DUKS L.J. 171; Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental
Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CH. L. Rev. 9 (1958) ; Currie, Conflicts,
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Granted that both preceding systems of order reflect thinking in
the law schools, it should be noted that these efforts entail imposing
an entirely new system of order upon the choice of law phenomenon.
Experience ought to warn the wary, however, that there exists a time
lag between the law schools and the practicing bar so that, whereas
new concepts may be freely imposed upon a class, new concepts must
be slowly inserted into the intellectual Weltanschauung of the practitioner. Granted, therefore, entirely new approaches in academic
circles coexisting with rising general dissatisfaction with the lex loci
delicti rule, it follows that someone would put forward an intermediate
choice of law formula, retaining lex loci, but modifying it by adding
to the equation some of the factors currently believed to be necessary
to obtain a fairer balancing of competing interests. 4'
Thus it is that programmes with which the choice of the proper
law can be made have been forthcoming since Morris's original suggestion. Each scheme assumes, however, that it is possible to programme
the choice of law process, that is, that a principle or set of principles
of order can be imposed upon the myriad of factors involved. As a
sidelight, moreover, perhaps evidence of the strain inherent in attempting to impose artificial concepts upon the flux and call it order, the
competing schools have not been overly kind in their comments about
each other.4 2 It is too early to suppose, however, that any of the
Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1; but see, M. Traynor, Conflict
of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REv.
845 (1961).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT o LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963)
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with
the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities
in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the state
of most significant relationship include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct occurred,
(c) the domicil, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the forum will
consider the issues, the character of the tort and the relevant purposes
of the tort rules involved.
42. E.g., speaking about Ehrenzweig, Currie observed that, "Actuarilly that
proposal is demolished by Morris ....
That it would poorly effectuate the interests
of the affected states is obvious." Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York,
1963 DUKn L.J. 1, 37 n.118. Then turning on Reese, the Reporter for the new
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Currie has unleashed several broadsides. "Normally
casebook editors leave it to the student to distinguish between dictum and ratio
decidendi." Id. at 3, n.10. "The reporter seems to find comfort in the view that the
That was an understandable
'decision does not reject the place of injury rule,' ....
interpretation, though not an especially perceptive one, when it was written." Currie,
Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. R~v. 1212, 1240 (1963). Ehrenzweig
has contented himself with the protest that, "Far from following Professor Currie
in treating my proposal as 'demolished' by actuarial considerations, the instant decision
lends it valuable support." Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM.
L. REv. 1212, 1246 (1963). Reese has adopted a very effective riposte: he treats Currie
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schools have the answer. The cases are too few, and the ideas about
torts itself, much less about choice of law, have not crystallized. If
order is consensus in the long run, then in the short. run we are left
with the le.x loci delicti rule and some interesting deviations, together
with some interesting theories which have yet to prove themselves in
the ultimate market-place of ideas about law, namely the courts. For
the time being one can only hope, like Morris, to apply the proper law,
taking into account the sundry factors now competing with lex loci
for consideration. By way of conclusion, therefore, a quotation from
I. A. Richards seems most apt:
The average educated man is growing more conscious, an
extraordinarily significant change. It is probably due to the fact
that his life is becoming more complex, more intricate, his desires
and needs more varied and more apt to conflict. And as he becomes
more conscious he can no longer be content to drift in unreflecting
obedience to custom. He is forced to reflect. And if reflection
often takes the form of inconclusive worrying, that is no more
than might be expected in view of the unparalleled difficulty of
the task. To live reasonably is much more difficult today than it
was in Dr. Johnson's time, and even then, as Boswell shows, it
was difficult enough.4"
as nonexistent. Reese, The Ever Changing Rules of Choice of Law, NETHERLANDS
INT L L. Rsv. 389 (1962); Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLuM. L.
REv. 1212, 1251 (1963).

43. Richards, Science and Poetry, CRITICISM:
506 (Schorer et al. ed. 1948).
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